New docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md covers the Platform API
split, Postgres schema and migration guarantees/rollback, the session
cookie architecture (including the whoami-routing-bug fix), the admin
portal, the API/security boundary, known limitations, and Phase 3+
future work.
Updates ENGINEERING_SOP.md §8, LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md, README.md, and
platform/README.md to reflect Platform API as the sole Provisioner
caller and Postgres as authoritative for identity/progress as of
Phase 2B.
Full acceptance test: admin auth (+ student-can't-call-admin check),
cohort create, 3-student add, curriculum assign, concurrent Prepare Labs
(3/3 ready, instant-reuse timing check), two students completing
different scenarios, dashboard reflecting completions, admin reset with
progress-intact assertion, admin destroy-labs with progress-intact
assertion for everyone, and a regression check that no Lab container
publishes a host port. 12/12 passing.
Removes the old identity service/volume, adds the api service (host
networking, Postgres URL, Provisioner shared secret, ADMIN_PASSWORD,
both required via :?). gateway now points PLATFORM_API_URL at it instead
of the old IDENTITY_BACKEND_URL.
New /admin route (frontend/src/admin/), gated by a separate admin
session (scrypt + timingSafeEqual against ADMIN_PASSWORD, no plaintext
storage, no new dependency). Covers cohort CRUD + roster + curriculum
assignment, and student CRUD + cohort assignment + environment/progress/
attempt views, all under /api/admin/* on the Platform API.
main.jsx now does a three-way path split (lab / admin / platform) so the
existing, unmodified Lab UI, the student dashboard, and the new admin
portal all ship in one Vite bundle without a router dependency.
Replaces the Phase 2A pilot ?sid= query param with an HttpOnly,
SameSite=Lax session cookie. Gateway now derives student identity from
the session (via Platform API's /api/session/whoami) instead of trusting
a client-suppliable id, and checks ownership on every proxied HTTP and
WebSocket Lab request, not just the initial navigation.
Fixes a routing bug found during testing: the fallback route was using
'does this session own a running environment' to decide whether an
unprefixed /api/* call belonged to the Lab UI or the dashboard — true in
both places. Replaced with an explicit LAB_OWNED_PATHS allowlist of the
exact unprefixed paths the existing Lab UI actually calls.
e2e-phase2a.js rewritten to use a cookie jar instead of headers/query
params, with explicit impersonation-rejection tests added. 10/10 passing.
New platform/api/ service owns students, cohorts, curriculum, progress,
scenario attempts, and student/admin sessions. No k3s, no --privileged,
no terminal runtime — starts instantly, unlike the old identity service
which booted an unused k3s cluster just to serve roster/progress APIs.
Provisioner calls (student and admin) are consolidated here too, in
provisioner-client.js, so it's the only service that talks to the
Provisioner directly.
- docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md — the full Phase 2A record: node-pty
root cause and fix, Gateway architecture, student flow (entry through
reset/recreate), API routes added, HTTP/WebSocket routing design (and why
the lab-session cookie exists), security model (what's checked, and the
explicit statement that this is pilot identity, not production auth),
reset/recreate and reaper-recovery semantics, and known limitations found
during implementation (the identity instance's k3s resource cost and its
network_mode: bridge requirement, the Gateway's in-memory cache scope, the
?sid= check's coverage). BUILT NOW vs. FUTURE (Phase 2B) called out
explicitly per the governing requirement.
- docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md, docs/ENGINEERING_SOP.md — status updated to
reflect Phase 2A is implemented and tested, not just Phase 1; roadmap item 5
updated accordingly; ENGINEERING_SOP's Provisioner section corrected (it's
no longer un-fronted — the Gateway is the only caller now).
- README.md — Multi-Student Deployment section updated to describe the
Gateway and student flow, not just the Provisioner; clarifies the
node-pty fix is the only change to the Lab image itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
platform/test/e2e-phase2a.js — 15 assert-based tests against a live
platform/docker-compose.dev.yml stack, exercising the full student flow
through the Gateway exactly as a browser would: roster -> login ->
curriculum -> launch (real k3s boot) -> Gateway HTTP routing -> invalid-token
rejection -> cross-student ownership rejection (?sid= mismatch) ->
same-student access -> progress relay (solve in one student's lab, confirm
it shows in their curriculum and NOT the other student's) -> reset (stable
launch_path, progress survives).
All 15 pass. This is slow (each real environment launch is a genuine k3s
cold start) and deliberately not meant for every commit — see
platform/README.md for when to run it.
Does not cover what needs a browser/WebSocket client — real Lab image
terminal (node-pty, kubectl execution, scenario validation) and idle-reaper
timing were verified manually; see
docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md §8 for exactly what and how.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
StudentDashboard.jsx — "Up Next" curriculum view + Launch Lab flow, in one
component since they share state (environment status affects what curriculum
actions make sense).
- Renders GET /api/curriculum/path as-is: the existing RootNode path
(Foundation -> Workloads -> Networking -> Configuration -> Troubleshooting
-> Real Ops -> Capstone), no new structure invented. Capstone stays the
locked placeholder from the earlier slice.
- Launch Lab -> POST /api/environment/launch, polls status every 2.5s while
provisioning/resetting, transitions through none -> provisioning -> running
-> error with a distinct UI state for each (EnvironmentPanel). On running,
navigates to launch_path with the student's own id as ?sid= — a
defense-in-depth ownership check the Gateway verifies on that specific
navigation (see the gateway commit).
- One "Recreate Lab" control, calling POST /api/environment/reset — no raw
destroy-without-recreate exposed to students, matching "don't expose raw
destroy/admin controls beyond what is safe for a student." A visible note
states progress is saved separately and survives.
Platform.module.css reuses the existing design tokens from index.css
(--green, --surface, --text, etc.) so this reads as the same product as the
Lab UI, not a bolted-on separate app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
New Platform Shell entry point (frontend/src/platform/) alongside the
existing, completely unmodified Lab UI (App.jsx and everything under
frontend/src/components/). main.jsx now splits on the current URL path —
/lab/<token>/ renders the existing <App/> exactly as before; anything else
renders the new <PlatformShell/>. Both live in the same built bundle (it's
served both by the persistent identity instance and by every ephemeral Lab
container), split purely at runtime.
- EntryScreen.jsx — cohort dropdown -> name dropdown (existing
GET /api/roster/cohorts, GET /api/roster?cohort=) -> POST /api/login. No
password. Visibly labeled pilot identity, not production auth, per the
governing requirement that this be stated explicitly, not just true in the
architecture docs.
- api.js — student_id lives in localStorage only, sent as X-Student-Id on
every authenticated request. Every authenticated call throws if no student
is stored rather than silently going out anonymously — this is what
"prevent accidental anonymous progress writes" means in practice, not just
a comment.
- PlatformShell.jsx — entry screen if no stored session, dashboard otherwise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Real architectural gap found and fixed during Phase 2A testing, not part of
the original plan: scenario validate/answer requests proxied through
/lab/<token>/api/scenarios/:id/{validate,answer} were writing progress into
that ephemeral Lab container's own SQLite — which is destroyed on every
reset/reap. Confirmed by testing: solving a scenario never showed up on the
dashboard's curriculum view, and would have been silently lost on lab
recreate, directly contradicting "academic progress must survive lab
reset/recreate."
Root tension: scenario validation must run against the student's own live
cluster (only exists inside their Lab container) — it can't be re-run
anywhere else. But the canonical progress record needs to live on the
persistent identity instance, which never has the student's actual cluster
state applied to it.
Fix: this endpoint (POST /api/progress/record) records an outcome WITHOUT
re-running validation — it exists purely so the Gateway can relay a
validate/answer result it already obtained from the real Lab. The Gateway
forwards the real request to the Lab, returns that real response to the
browser unchanged, and separately calls this endpoint with the outcome. See
platform/gateway/src/server.js's relayScenarioOutcome().
Verified end-to-end: a scenario solved through a student's Lab shows up in
their curriculum immediately, survives their lab being destroyed and reset,
and is correctly attributed only to that student (not visible to a second
student's own curriculum view).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
New internal component (platform/gateway/) — the only student-facing path to
disposable Lab environments. Browsers never reach a Lab container, the
Provisioner, or Postgres directly.
Routes:
- /api/environment/{status,launch,reset} — student-facing glue (X-Student-Id),
calls the Provisioner internally (shared secret never reaches the browser).
Reuses an existing non-terminal environment on launch rather than always
provisioning a new one; reset destroys+recreates the same environment row.
- /lab/<token>/* — HTTP+WS proxy into that one student's Lab container,
resolved by opaque routing token via a new Provisioner endpoint
(GET /environments/by-token/:token). No raw container IP/port ever reaches
the browser. Rejects invalid tokens (404), unready environments (202/503),
and cross-student access via an optional ?sid= ownership check (403) — see
docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md "Security" for why token-alone,
student-id-alone, and env-id-alone are each individually insufficient and
this is explicitly pilot-grade, not production auth.
- everything else — proxied to the persistent identity/curriculum backend
(roster, login, curriculum, progress, platform-shell frontend), or to the
student's own Lab if a valid lab-session cookie is present.
Routing design note: the existing Lab UI makes root-relative calls
(fetch('/api/scenarios'), the /shell-ws WebSocket) with no idea it might be
served under a /lab/<token>/ prefix — preserving that UI unmodified was a
hard requirement. Solved with an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie set on the
first /lab/<token>/ response: every later request from that browser carries
it, so the unmodified Lab UI's own unprefixed calls resolve correctly once a
student has navigated into a lab session, with zero changes to its code.
/api/environment/* is explicitly exempted from cookie-based routing so it
never gets hijacked by an active lab session.
Also added platform/docker-compose.dev.yml (the full local stack: Postgres +
egress-proxy + Provisioner + a persistent "identity" instance + Gateway) and
platform/README.md tying the components together. The "identity" instance
required an explicit `network_mode: bridge` — under Compose's own
auto-created bridge network, k3s failed at startup with "no default routes
found in /proc/net/route"; documented as a known limitation, not fully
root-caused.
Found and fixed during testing: express.json() applied globally broke
http-proxy's re-streaming of proxied POST bodies (e.g. POST /api/roster hung
forever, since the body had already been consumed by the parser before
proxy.web() tried to forward it). Removed — none of the Gateway's own routes
actually need a parsed body.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Root cause, confirmed empirically (not guessed):
1. node-gyp generates an incorrect build/config.gypi for this NodeSource-packaged
Node 20 build — it reports node_shared: true (expects a shared libnode.so),
but the actual installed Node is statically linked (no libnode.so.<abi>
exists anywhere on the system; process.config.variables.node_shared on the
real running Node is false). node-gyp trusted the wrong config and linked
node-pty's native addon against -lnode, producing a binary that fails at
require() time with "libnode.so.127: cannot open shared object file" —
confirmed by loading the compiled .node file directly, bypassing node-pty's
own path-search/error-masking logic (which collapses this into a generic
"Cannot find module .../pty.node" across every path it checks).
2. A second, independent bug compounded it: no .dockerignore existed. A
host-side `npm install` (run earlier for backend testing) left
backend/node_modules on disk, built against the host's own environment. The
Dockerfile's `COPY backend/ ./backend/` (placed after the npm-install RUN
layer, for build-cache efficiency) silently overwrote the correctly-built
node_modules with that host copy — including after a first .dockerignore
fix using the pattern `node_modules/`, which only matches a node_modules
directory at the build context ROOT in Docker's matching rules, not at any
depth (unlike .gitignore, where the same-looking pattern does match any
depth — a real, confirmed gotcha, not an assumption).
Fix:
- Dockerfile: `ENV npm_config_node_shared=false` (image-level, not a one-off
RUN prefix, so it can't be silently lost if a native module ever gets
rebuilt again for any reason) + a build-time `node -e "require(...)"` check
that fails the build loudly if this regresses, instead of shipping a silent
runtime failure.
- .dockerignore: `**/node_modules/` (recursive), not `node_modules/`.
No terminal architecture change, no fake shell, no changes to
backend/server.js's PTY handling. RootNode branding and upstream KubeKosh
attribution untouched. The single-container dev workflow
(`docker build -t rootnode-academy:test .`) is the same command as before —
it now just works.
Verified against the real image end-to-end, not a stand-in: build -> container
starts -> k3s reaches Ready -> backend starts, no crash -> nginx starts ->
browser UI 200s -> terminal WebSocket opens showing the RootNode banner ->
`kubectl get nodes` run through the terminal returns real cluster state ->
deploy-nginx scenario solved via the terminal -> all 5 validation checks pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
- docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md — the full ephemeral-per-student design: two-VM
production topology (Platform VM / Lab Host VM, correction A), lifecycle,
data model, networking/egress model (correction B), resource model,
routing/auth model, security boundaries, failure/recovery behavior,
migration path from the current single container, and the lab-host
abstraction (correction D). Status updated to reflect Phase 1 is now
implemented, pointing at the two docs below for specifics.
- docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md — the Phase 1 build plan: exact Postgres
schema, service boundaries, API routes, lifecycle state machine, Docker/
firewall commands, security assumptions, file layout, and a 12-test plan.
Updated with "Implementation notes" at the points where testing surfaced
real deviations from the original design: the per-network (not static)
egress-proxy address resolution, the COALESCE reaper fix, and the
provisioning-failure cleanup fix.
- docs/ENGINEERING_SOP.md — new §8 mapping the platform/provisioner/ and
platform/egress-proxy/ components, what's built vs. not (no Gateway, no
frontend wiring — internal API only), and where identity still lives
(unchanged: Lab image's own SQLite). Roadmap item 5 (per-student isolation)
updated from "not started" to "Phase 1 done, not yet cleared for minors."
- README.md — Multi-Student Deployment section rewritten: the old per-student-
volume persistence model is superseded by the Platform's registry (progress
already lives outside the disposable container as of the prior curriculum/
roster work); points at docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md and platform/provisioner/
for the real architecture instead of describing three delivery modes that
were never actually built out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
platform/provisioner/test/run.js — 12 assert-based integration tests against a
live docker-compose.dev.yml stack (no framework, matching the project's
existing convention). Covers: health/auth, provision with unique
network/container/token, duplicate-provision rejection, distinct
subnets/IPs for concurrent students, the egress firewall ordering fix
specifically (proxy ACCEPT before the RFC1918 DROP for the same range),
student-to-student isolation, RFC1918 blocking, reset (same identity, fresh
container), destroy (deterministic cleanup), and the audit trail (all
expected events present, routing token never logged).
All 12 pass against the default lightweight test image. Several properties
were validated manually during implementation rather than automated here —
idle reaper timing (needs a real threshold wait), remote TCP+TLS lab-host
(needs a Docker-in-Docker sidecar, too heavy for routine runs),
reconciliation-on-crash (needs an out-of-band container kill + process
restart), and real-Lab-image k3s behavior (environment-specific, see the
Phase 1 final report and platform/provisioner/README.md's known limitations)
— each is noted at the bottom of the file with why it's not automated here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Background loop (src/reaper.js), config-driven idle/abandoned thresholds and
poll interval (no hard-coded numbers) — without this, "ephemeral by default"
is just a description: a closed browser tab does not stop a running k3s
cluster on its own.
Past the idle threshold: logs a warning event only. Past the abandoned
threshold: destroys via the same path DELETE /environments/:id uses, so
cleanup is identical either way, and logs event_type='reaped_idle'.
Failure-safe — one environment's teardown throwing never stops the reaper
from checking the rest, and a Postgres/Docker hiccup on one tick just means
"try again next tick," never a crashed process.
Uses COALESCE(last_active_at, created_at) rather than bare last_active_at.
Found during testing: an environment that fails during provisioning (before
ever reaching 'running') has a NULL last_active_at, and NULL < anything is
never true in SQL — without the fallback, a failed-and-never-cleaned-up
environment would never have aged out here regardless of how long it sat
there. This is the second, independent safety net on top of
provisionEnvironment's own best-effort cleanup on failure (see the
platform-provisioner commit).
Verified end-to-end: backdated an environment's last_active_at past the
abandoned threshold, waited for a real reaper tick, confirmed full
deterministic cleanup (container, network, firewall chain all gone) with the
correct actor='reaper' attribution in environment_events.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Egress enforcement is a firewall-layer control, not an application-layer
convention (correction B). HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY configure containerd for a
clean pull path; they enforce nothing on their own.
- src/egress.js — per-environment dedicated iptables chain
(ROOTNODE-ENV-<short-id>), built with -A (append, order-preserving) rather
than the -I (insert-at-head) pattern an earlier design draft used, which
would have installed rules in reverse order and let the default-deny shadow
the proxy/DNS accepts. Required infrastructure (egress proxy, DNS) is
explicitly permitted first, then RFC1918 ranges are dropped unconditionally,
then a final default-deny catches the public internet. One jump rule per
environment hooks its subnet into its chain from DOCKER-USER (the chain
Docker guarantees it won't silently rewrite). Destroy is deterministic:
unhook, flush, delete — no comment-grep matching.
The ordering fix is empirically verified, not just reasoned about: the
egress proxy's own address is itself an RFC1918 address (it's Platform-side
infrastructure), and testing confirms it's reachable while the broader
RFC1918 range is still blocked — exactly the scenario the original ordering
bug would have broken.
- platform/egress-proxy/ — shared Squid instance (one per deployment, not
per-student), destination-allowlisted (dstdomain ACL against a plain-text
allowlist file), starting set covers docker.io/ghcr.io/gcr.io/quay.io/k8s.io.
Proxy performs domain allowlisting; the firewall chain above is what makes
it unbypassable, not the other way around.
The egress proxy's address is resolved per-student-network (each network's
Docker gateway IP, since the proxy runs with host networking and is present
on every bridge gateway) rather than a fixed hostname — a static address
wouldn't be reachable from more than one isolated student network at a time.
Found while testing with two simultaneous environments.
Verified: student-to-student isolation (A cannot reach B's internal IP),
RFC1918 blocking (A cannot reach a simulated trusted-infra address), and the
proxy allowlist itself (CONNECT tunnel to an allowlisted host succeeds,
non-allowlisted gets a clean 403 from Squid).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Internal-only service (platform/provisioner/) implementing the environment
lifecycle from docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md: provision -> running ->
(reset -> running | destroy -> destroyed), plus experimental suspend/resume
(decision #3 — never on the guaranteed path, never relied on for correctness).
- src/docker.js — the lab-host abstraction (correction D). Resolves a
lab_hosts row into a connected dockerode client, unix:// socket or tcp://
with TLS client-cert auth. Refuses to connect to a tcp:// endpoint with no
TLS material configured rather than connecting unauthenticated. Validated
against both a local socket and a real remote Docker-in-Docker TLS endpoint
during testing — same code path either way, only the lab_hosts config
differs, which is the entire point.
- src/lifecycle.js — provision/destroy/reset/suspend/resume orchestration,
wired to docker.js + egress.js + the Postgres registry. Every Lab container
is privileged (required for k3s, not avoidable), gets its own Docker network,
no published host ports, deterministic naming (rootnode-lab-<short-id> /
rootnode-lab-net-<short-id>), and a CSPRNG routing token. Includes
reconcileOnStartup(), implementing the "don't trust stale state after a
crash/restart" requirement from docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md §8 — verified by
killing a container out-of-band and confirming a Provisioner restart flags
the mismatch instead of trusting the stale 'running' row.
Found and fixed during testing: a provisioning failure (e.g. readiness
timeout) left an orphaned container/network/firewall chain behind with only
the DB row marked 'error'. provisionEnvironment's catch block now does
best-effort teardown of whatever was already created before marking the row
error — confirmed by deliberately failing a provision and checking no
container/network/chain survived it.
- src/server.js — the internal HTTP API (X-Provisioner-Key shared-secret auth
on every route, matching the instructor-passcode pattern already used for
the roster endpoint). Input validation on student_id/environment_id,
structured JSON errors with a request id, routing tokens redacted from every
response.
- docker-compose.dev.yml — Postgres + egress-proxy + provisioner on one
machine (the documented Phase 1 dev exception). provisioner and egress-proxy
run with network_mode: host + NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW, which is what lets
src/egress.js manipulate the host's DOCKER-USER chain without needing
interactive host sudo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
New Phase 1 Platform database — PostgreSQL, separate from the Lab image's own
SQLite (which keeps its current students/progress data untouched, decision #2 /
correction C in docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md).
Schema (platform/provisioner/migrations/):
- lab_hosts: the abstraction that keeps Docker connectivity out of code —
endpoint (unix:// or tcp://+TLS), enabled flag. Phase 1 ships one row.
- environments: environment_id (UUID), student_id (opaque external identifier,
no FK — students table isn't in this database yet), lab_host_id (real FK),
status, routing_token (CSPRNG via crypto.randomBytes, opaque), container/
network identity, resource limits, lifecycle timestamps.
- environment_events: append-only audit trail, one row per lifecycle
transition, never logs the routing token in plaintext (see
lifecycle.js's redact()).
File-based migration runner (db.js) matching the check-before-alter idempotency
pattern already used in the Lab image's backend/server.js, applied on every
Provisioner boot.
Resource limits and the lab_hosts seed are config files
(config/resource-policy.yaml, config/lab-hosts.seed.yaml), not database tables —
there's no admin UI to manage them via a database yet, so a DB-backed policy
table would just be a write path nothing uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
Pre-Phase-1 platform work, approved and tested earlier but not yet committed:
- Terminal banner: "RootNode Academy Lab — node: k8s-lab", upstream KubeKosh
attribution left untouched in footer/README/LICENSE.
- RootNode curriculum mode: scenarios/rootnode-path.json (Foundation -> Workloads
-> Networking -> Configuration -> Troubleshooting -> Real Ops -> Capstone),
built from existing scenario content grouped by category, no new scenarios
invented. New GET /api/curriculum/path endpoint.
- Student roster + per-student progress: instructor-roster, pick-your-name login
(no password), students/environments-adjacent progress table migrated to a
(student_id, scenario_id) composite key so practice progress and exam sessions
are isolated per student instead of one global bucket. New /api/roster,
/api/login endpoints.
- scenarios/data/*.json: added isolation_type metadata (shared_namespace vs
ephemeral_cluster) from an audit of which scenarios execute cluster-scoped or
node-level commands. This was Tier-1-isolation groundwork that got superseded
same-day by the full-ephemeral-per-student architecture (see
docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md) — the field is kept as descriptive metadata only,
per the note now in scenarios/SCHEMA.md. Not wasted: it's an accurate audit of
which scenarios touch cluster-scoped resources, useful independent of isolation
model.
- .gitignore added (node_modules/, frontend/dist/, *.db, /data/, .env) — none
existed before; without it, npm installs during testing would have landed in
a commit.
Known limitation still open: no frontend UI for any of this yet (login screen,
roster-add form, curriculum view) — API-only. No auth on the roster-add endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
- Split `scenarios/scenarios.json` into individual JSON files under `scenarios/data/` named `<scenario-id>.json`
- Split `scenarios/bundles.json` into individual JSON files under `scenarios/bundles/` named `<bundle-id>.json`
- Updated `backend/server.js` to dynamically load scenario and bundle files from their respective directories
- Updated documentation in `scenarios/SCHEMA.md` and `README.md` to reflect the new repository layout and contributor workflow
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Sinha <[email protected]>
ced4568
