ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5
60fbf0c385
Pre-Phase-1 platform work, approved and tested earlier but not yet committed: - Terminal banner: "RootNode Academy Lab — node: k8s-lab", upstream KubeKosh attribution left untouched in footer/README/LICENSE. - RootNode curriculum mode: scenarios/rootnode-path.json (Foundation -> Workloads -> Networking -> Configuration -> Troubleshooting -> Real Ops -> Capstone), built from existing scenario content grouped by category, no new scenarios invented. New GET /api/curriculum/path endpoint. - Student roster + per-student progress: instructor-roster, pick-your-name login (no password), students/environments-adjacent progress table migrated to a (student_id, scenario_id) composite key so practice progress and exam sessions are isolated per student instead of one global bucket. New /api/roster, /api/login endpoints. - scenarios/data/*.json: added isolation_type metadata (shared_namespace vs ephemeral_cluster) from an audit of which scenarios execute cluster-scoped or node-level commands. This was Tier-1-isolation groundwork that got superseded same-day by the full-ephemeral-per-student architecture (see docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md) — the field is kept as descriptive metadata only, per the note now in scenarios/SCHEMA.md. Not wasted: it's an accurate audit of which scenarios touch cluster-scoped resources, useful independent of isolation model. - .gitignore added (node_modules/, frontend/dist/, *.db, /data/, .env) — none existed before; without it, npm installs during testing would have landed in a commit. Known limitation still open: no frontend UI for any of this yet (login screen, roster-add form, curriculum view) — API-only. No auth on the roster-add endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
47 lines
2.2 KiB
JSON
47 lines
2.2 KiB
JSON
{
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"id": "cks-network-policy-metadata",
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"title": "Block Cloud Metadata",
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"category": "Network Security",
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"isolation_type": "shared_namespace",
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"difficulty": "Hard",
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"type": "task",
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"weight": 6,
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"description": "## Restricting Cloud Metadata Access\n\nCloud providers expose sensitive instance metadata at `169.254.169.254`. An attacker exploiting an SSRF vulnerability can use this to steal cloud credentials.\n\n**Your task:**\n\nCreate a NetworkPolicy named `deny-metadata` in the `default` namespace that applies to all pods. It should explicitly **deny** all Egress traffic to the IP block `169.254.169.254/32`, while **allowing** all other Egress traffic.\n\n```bash\n# Tip: Use an ipBlock exception (except).\n```",
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"hints": [
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{
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"title": "Except IPBlock",
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"body": "Create an Egress rule that allows all traffic (`0.0.0.0/0`) EXCEPT `169.254.169.254/32`.",
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"command": "cat <<EOF | kubectl apply -f -\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: NetworkPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: deny-metadata\n namespace: default\nspec:\n podSelector: {}\n policyTypes:\n - Egress\n egress:\n - to:\n - ipBlock:\n cidr: 0.0.0.0/0\n except:\n - 169.254.169.254/32\nEOF"
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}
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],
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"setup_commands": [],
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"validation": {
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"commands": [
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{
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"description": "NetworkPolicy deny-metadata exists",
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"command": "kubectl get networkpolicy deny-metadata -o jsonpath='{.metadata.name}'",
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"expected_output": "deny-metadata",
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"match": "exact"
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},
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{
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"description": "Policy applies to all pods",
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"command": "kubectl get networkpolicy deny-metadata -o jsonpath='{.spec.podSelector.matchLabels}'",
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"expected_output": "",
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"match": "exact"
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},
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{
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"description": "Policy blocks metadata server",
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"command": "kubectl get networkpolicy deny-metadata -o jsonpath='{.spec.egress[0].to[0].ipBlock.except[0]}' 2>/dev/null",
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"expected_output": "169.254.169.254/32",
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"match": "exact"
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}
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]
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},
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"default_namespace": "default",
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"teardown_commands": [
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{
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"command": "kubectl delete networkpolicy deny-metadata --ignore-not-found"
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}
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]
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}
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