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Gate 1 — canonical state audit: this workstation's HEAD/origin/main and every claimed milestone SHA (Phase 2A through 9.1) verified consistent; no stranded branches/tags on Gitea; full-history secret scan clean (no rotation required); Phase 9.5 confirmed absent from canonical history (pricing was given directly by Chase and used without it); second-PC reconciliation commands provided since this session cannot see that machine. Gate 3 — secrets: real inventory derived from process.env greps across every service (not guessed); Infisical auth fixed (wrong domain was the actual root cause of Phase 9.1's failures — the identity belongs to infisical.cedshomelab.com, not app.infisical.com) but no RootNode Academy project exists there yet, contradicting this phase's own authorization — flagged for Chase to create. Gates 4-9/15-16 — production: verified, not assumed, that no dedicated server/Proxmox VM has been provisioned (empty terraform.tfvars, no state file, placeholder group_vars/production.yml) — IaC validated (tofu validate, ansible --syntax-check both clean) and left unexecuted per this phase's own 'do not fake production deployment' instruction. rootnodeacademy.com confirmed live (Cloudflare, real HTTPS) — the separate, not-RootNode-owned website; no Platform API subdomain exists yet. Gate 18 — security audit: full review against every regression suite rerun this phase; no launch-critical defect found. Gates 19/20 — full regression (131 checks: e2e-phase5b/5c/6f/7/8/9, content validation, migrations, frontend build) and the Winter Break commerce rehearsal, both rerun clean against current main. Gates 10-14/21 — website integration, Winter Break pricing (99/49, real, Stripe-validated), agreements/legal, tax, and refund policy all reviewed; legal text/tax/refund policy/dates/venue/ capacity correctly left as open owner decisions, not invented. No application code changed this phase — audit/launch-prep only.
5.2 KiB
5.2 KiB
Phase 10 — Security Audit
Gate 18. A production-oriented review of RootNode Academy's security posture, drawing on every
regression suite rerun this phase (docs/PHASE10_LAUNCH_READINESS.md) plus direct code review.
No genuine launch-critical defect was found this phase — the one real defect Phase 10's
predecessor phases exposed (Phase 9.1's webhook-correlation bug) was already fixed and
regression-tested before this phase began.
| Area | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Student authentication | ✅ Verified | e2e-phase5b.js/e2e-phase5c.js rerun clean this phase — activation, single-use tokens, expiration, password reset with anti-enumeration, session revocation on reset. |
| Instructor authentication | ✅ Verified | Same suites — instructor login, RBAC roles (owner/admin/instructor). |
| Sessions | ✅ Verified | Persistent, server-controlled sessions (Phase 3A); a real Platform API restart preserves sessions/enrollment state (rerun clean this phase). |
| Password reset / activation | ✅ Verified | Single-use, server-side expiration, no plaintext token ever returned by any admin API (toAdminView never includes it). |
| RBAC | ✅ Verified | Admin/owner-only routes (guardian detail, payment data) vs. any-instructor routes (offering/location lists) — reconfirmed across Phase 7/8/9 suites this phase. |
| Cohort scoping | ✅ Verified | An instructor sharing a cohort can manage; an unrelated instructor cannot (Phase 5B/7 suites). |
| CSRF | ✅ Present, unchanged | platform/api/src/security.js + per-route session/cookie checks (student/instructor auth routes) — not modified this phase, no regression. |
| Rate limiting / lockout | ✅ Present, unchanged | Login-attempt tracking in security.js (matches the existing sweeper pattern also used for session expiry). |
| Audit logging | ✅ Verified | Every admin/integration action recorded; audit-hygiene test (no secrets/PII in audit metadata) rerun clean in e2e-phase9.js. |
| Server-authoritative pricing | ✅ Verified, real Stripe | Phase 9.1 proved a tampered caller amount is ignored against Stripe's own recorded object, not just RootNode's database. |
| Agreement enforcement | ✅ Verified | Checkout blocked (409) until acceptance, in both the deterministic suite and real Stripe TEST mode. |
| Capacity enforcement | ✅ Verified | Race-safe seat reservation (reserved_seats < capacity in one UPDATE) — last-seat race test rerun clean this phase. |
| No card-data storage | ✅ Verified | payment_transactions schema has no card fields; explicit admin-view test asserts none appear; Stripe's hosted Checkout is the only thing that ever sees a real card. |
| Webhook signature verification | ✅ Verified, real Stripe | Invalid/forged signatures rejected (both deterministic and real-Stripe-signed tests); idempotent via a real DB primary key on the provider's event id, reconfirmed with a genuinely re-signed real Stripe event in Phase 9.1. |
| Logging/audit redaction | ✅ Verified | This session's own Stripe secret/webhook-secret values were grepped across every log/scratch file produced — none found; e2e-phase9.js's hygiene test asserts no sk_/whsec_/card-number pattern in audit metadata or metrics text. |
| Secrets never committed | ✅ Verified | Full-history pickaxe search this phase — clean (docs/PHASE10_CANONICAL_STATE_AUDIT.md §1.6). |
| mTLS (Provisioner ↔ Docker, Gateway ↔ Lab Host Router) | ✅ Present, unchanged, not re-verified live | Ansible docker-tls role and TLS env vars exist; cannot be exercised against a real mTLS handshake without real hardware (Gate 4/5's hardware blocker). |
| Privileged lab boundary / RFC1918 egress denial | ✅ Present, unchanged | provisioner/src/egress.js; this phase reconfirmed the module exists and is wired, did not re-run Phase 1/2's own dedicated isolation drills (out of this phase's changed-code scope — nothing touched networking code). |
Production cookie settings (COOKIE_SECURE) |
✅ Present, verified pattern | e2e-phase5c.js's own test explicitly proves COOKIE_SECURE=1 production gating via a real container recreate — reconfirmed present, not re-executed as a fresh drill this phase since nothing in that code path changed. |
| HTTPS end-to-end | ⏸ Cannot verify — no production host | COOKIE_SECURE=1/TRUST_PROXY=1 require a real HTTPS-terminating reverse proxy in front of a real Gateway, which doesn't exist yet (Gate 4-6's hardware blocker). The marketing site at rootnodeacademy.com IS real HTTPS (Cloudflare) — the Platform API itself has no production endpoint yet. |
Findings requiring action
None launch-critical within existing architecture. Everything marked ⏸ above is blocked on
the same missing production server documented in docs/PHASE10_PRODUCTION_DEPLOYMENT.md — not
a code defect, and building around it (e.g. faking an HTTPS check) would violate this phase's
own "do not fake production readiness" instruction.
Scope discipline
This audit reviewed and reconfirmed existing security properties; it did not expand into new security tooling, new scanning infrastructure, or unrelated hardening work not already part of Phase 1-9's architecture, per Phase 10's own "do not expand into unrelated feature work" instruction.