rootnode-academy

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53 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5	0116ee1522	feat(networking): enforce isolated lab egress policy Egress enforcement is a firewall-layer control, not an application-layer convention (correction B). HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY configure containerd for a clean pull path; they enforce nothing on their own. - src/egress.js — per-environment dedicated iptables chain (ROOTNODE-ENV-<short-id>), built with -A (append, order-preserving) rather than the -I (insert-at-head) pattern an earlier design draft used, which would have installed rules in reverse order and let the default-deny shadow the proxy/DNS accepts. Required infrastructure (egress proxy, DNS) is explicitly permitted first, then RFC1918 ranges are dropped unconditionally, then a final default-deny catches the public internet. One jump rule per environment hooks its subnet into its chain from DOCKER-USER (the chain Docker guarantees it won't silently rewrite). Destroy is deterministic: unhook, flush, delete — no comment-grep matching. The ordering fix is empirically verified, not just reasoned about: the egress proxy's own address is itself an RFC1918 address (it's Platform-side infrastructure), and testing confirms it's reachable while the broader RFC1918 range is still blocked — exactly the scenario the original ordering bug would have broken. - platform/egress-proxy/ — shared Squid instance (one per deployment, not per-student), destination-allowlisted (dstdomain ACL against a plain-text allowlist file), starting set covers docker.io/ghcr.io/gcr.io/quay.io/k8s.io. Proxy performs domain allowlisting; the firewall chain above is what makes it unbypassable, not the other way around. The egress proxy's address is resolved per-student-network (each network's Docker gateway IP, since the proxy runs with host networking and is present on every bridge gateway) rather than a fixed hostname — a static address wouldn't be reachable from more than one isolated student network at a time. Found while testing with two simultaneous environments. Verified: student-to-student isolation (A cannot reach B's internal IP), RFC1918 blocking (A cannot reach a simulated trusted-infra address), and the proxy allowlist itself (CONNECT tunnel to an allowlisted host succeeds, non-allowlisted gets a clean 403 from Squid). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-18 01:22:10 -05:00
ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5	c8dd33522f	feat(provisioner): add disposable lab lifecycle Internal-only service (platform/provisioner/) implementing the environment lifecycle from docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md: provision -> running -> (reset -> running \| destroy -> destroyed), plus experimental suspend/resume (decision #3 — never on the guaranteed path, never relied on for correctness). - src/docker.js — the lab-host abstraction (correction D). Resolves a lab_hosts row into a connected dockerode client, unix:// socket or tcp:// with TLS client-cert auth. Refuses to connect to a tcp:// endpoint with no TLS material configured rather than connecting unauthenticated. Validated against both a local socket and a real remote Docker-in-Docker TLS endpoint during testing — same code path either way, only the lab_hosts config differs, which is the entire point. - src/lifecycle.js — provision/destroy/reset/suspend/resume orchestration, wired to docker.js + egress.js + the Postgres registry. Every Lab container is privileged (required for k3s, not avoidable), gets its own Docker network, no published host ports, deterministic naming (rootnode-lab-<short-id> / rootnode-lab-net-<short-id>), and a CSPRNG routing token. Includes reconcileOnStartup(), implementing the "don't trust stale state after a crash/restart" requirement from docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md §8 — verified by killing a container out-of-band and confirming a Provisioner restart flags the mismatch instead of trusting the stale 'running' row. Found and fixed during testing: a provisioning failure (e.g. readiness timeout) left an orphaned container/network/firewall chain behind with only the DB row marked 'error'. provisionEnvironment's catch block now does best-effort teardown of whatever was already created before marking the row error — confirmed by deliberately failing a provision and checking no container/network/chain survived it. - src/server.js — the internal HTTP API (X-Provisioner-Key shared-secret auth on every route, matching the instructor-passcode pattern already used for the roster endpoint). Input validation on student_id/environment_id, structured JSON errors with a request id, routing tokens redacted from every response. - docker-compose.dev.yml — Postgres + egress-proxy + provisioner on one machine (the documented Phase 1 dev exception). provisioner and egress-proxy run with network_mode: host + NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW, which is what lets src/egress.js manipulate the host's DOCKER-USER chain without needing interactive host sudo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-18 01:21:52 -05:00
ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5	62241d26d2	feat(platform-db): add lab host and environment registry New Phase 1 Platform database — PostgreSQL, separate from the Lab image's own SQLite (which keeps its current students/progress data untouched, decision #2 / correction C in docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md). Schema (platform/provisioner/migrations/): - lab_hosts: the abstraction that keeps Docker connectivity out of code — endpoint (unix:// or tcp://+TLS), enabled flag. Phase 1 ships one row. - environments: environment_id (UUID), student_id (opaque external identifier, no FK — students table isn't in this database yet), lab_host_id (real FK), status, routing_token (CSPRNG via crypto.randomBytes, opaque), container/ network identity, resource limits, lifecycle timestamps. - environment_events: append-only audit trail, one row per lifecycle transition, never logs the routing token in plaintext (see lifecycle.js's redact()). File-based migration runner (db.js) matching the check-before-alter idempotency pattern already used in the Lab image's backend/server.js, applied on every Provisioner boot. Resource limits and the lab_hosts seed are config files (config/resource-policy.yaml, config/lab-hosts.seed.yaml), not database tables — there's no admin UI to manage them via a database yet, so a DB-backed policy table would just be a write path nothing uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>	2026-08-18 01:21:31 -05:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5

0116ee1522

feat(networking): enforce isolated lab egress policy

Egress enforcement is a firewall-layer control, not an application-layer
convention (correction B). HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY configure containerd for a
clean pull path; they enforce nothing on their own.

- src/egress.js — per-environment dedicated iptables chain
  (ROOTNODE-ENV-<short-id>), built with -A (append, order-preserving) rather
  than the -I (insert-at-head) pattern an earlier design draft used, which
  would have installed rules in reverse order and let the default-deny shadow
  the proxy/DNS accepts. Required infrastructure (egress proxy, DNS) is
  explicitly permitted first, then RFC1918 ranges are dropped unconditionally,
  then a final default-deny catches the public internet. One jump rule per
  environment hooks its subnet into its chain from DOCKER-USER (the chain
  Docker guarantees it won't silently rewrite). Destroy is deterministic:
  unhook, flush, delete — no comment-grep matching.

  The ordering fix is empirically verified, not just reasoned about: the
  egress proxy's own address is itself an RFC1918 address (it's Platform-side
  infrastructure), and testing confirms it's reachable while the broader
  RFC1918 range is still blocked — exactly the scenario the original ordering
  bug would have broken.

- platform/egress-proxy/ — shared Squid instance (one per deployment, not
  per-student), destination-allowlisted (dstdomain ACL against a plain-text
  allowlist file), starting set covers docker.io/ghcr.io/gcr.io/quay.io/k8s.io.
  Proxy performs domain allowlisting; the firewall chain above is what makes
  it unbypassable, not the other way around.

  The egress proxy's address is resolved per-student-network (each network's
  Docker gateway IP, since the proxy runs with host networking and is present
  on every bridge gateway) rather than a fixed hostname — a static address
  wouldn't be reachable from more than one isolated student network at a time.
  Found while testing with two simultaneous environments.

Verified: student-to-student isolation (A cannot reach B's internal IP),
RFC1918 blocking (A cannot reach a simulated trusted-infra address), and the
proxy allowlist itself (CONNECT tunnel to an allowlisted host succeeds,
non-allowlisted gets a clean 403 from Squid).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

2026-08-18 01:22:10 -05:00

ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5

c8dd33522f

feat(provisioner): add disposable lab lifecycle

Internal-only service (platform/provisioner/) implementing the environment
lifecycle from docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md: provision -> running ->
(reset -> running | destroy -> destroyed), plus experimental suspend/resume
(decision #3 — never on the guaranteed path, never relied on for correctness).

- src/docker.js — the lab-host abstraction (correction D). Resolves a
  lab_hosts row into a connected dockerode client, unix:// socket or tcp://
  with TLS client-cert auth. Refuses to connect to a tcp:// endpoint with no
  TLS material configured rather than connecting unauthenticated. Validated
  against both a local socket and a real remote Docker-in-Docker TLS endpoint
  during testing — same code path either way, only the lab_hosts config
  differs, which is the entire point.

- src/lifecycle.js — provision/destroy/reset/suspend/resume orchestration,
  wired to docker.js + egress.js + the Postgres registry. Every Lab container
  is privileged (required for k3s, not avoidable), gets its own Docker network,
  no published host ports, deterministic naming (rootnode-lab-<short-id> /
  rootnode-lab-net-<short-id>), and a CSPRNG routing token. Includes
  reconcileOnStartup(), implementing the "don't trust stale state after a
  crash/restart" requirement from docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md §8 — verified by
  killing a container out-of-band and confirming a Provisioner restart flags
  the mismatch instead of trusting the stale 'running' row.

  Found and fixed during testing: a provisioning failure (e.g. readiness
  timeout) left an orphaned container/network/firewall chain behind with only
  the DB row marked 'error'. provisionEnvironment's catch block now does
  best-effort teardown of whatever was already created before marking the row
  error — confirmed by deliberately failing a provision and checking no
  container/network/chain survived it.

- src/server.js — the internal HTTP API (X-Provisioner-Key shared-secret auth
  on every route, matching the instructor-passcode pattern already used for
  the roster endpoint). Input validation on student_id/environment_id,
  structured JSON errors with a request id, routing tokens redacted from every
  response.

- docker-compose.dev.yml — Postgres + egress-proxy + provisioner on one
  machine (the documented Phase 1 dev exception). provisioner and egress-proxy
  run with network_mode: host + NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW, which is what lets
  src/egress.js manipulate the host's DOCKER-USER chain without needing
  interactive host sudo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

2026-08-18 01:21:52 -05:00

ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5

62241d26d2

feat(platform-db): add lab host and environment registry

New Phase 1 Platform database — PostgreSQL, separate from the Lab image's own
SQLite (which keeps its current students/progress data untouched, decision #2 /
correction C in docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md).

Schema (platform/provisioner/migrations/):
- lab_hosts: the abstraction that keeps Docker connectivity out of code —
  endpoint (unix:// or tcp://+TLS), enabled flag. Phase 1 ships one row.
- environments: environment_id (UUID), student_id (opaque external identifier,
  no FK — students table isn't in this database yet), lab_host_id (real FK),
  status, routing_token (CSPRNG via crypto.randomBytes, opaque), container/
  network identity, resource limits, lifecycle timestamps.
- environment_events: append-only audit trail, one row per lifecycle
  transition, never logs the routing token in plaintext (see
  lifecycle.js's redact()).

File-based migration runner (db.js) matching the check-before-alter idempotency
pattern already used in the Lab image's backend/server.js, applied on every
Provisioner boot.

Resource limits and the lab_hosts seed are config files
(config/resource-policy.yaml, config/lab-hosts.seed.yaml), not database tables —
there's no admin UI to manage them via a database yet, so a DB-backed policy
table would just be a write path nothing uses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>

2026-08-18 01:21:31 -05:00