ced4568andClaude Sonnet 5
0116ee1522
Egress enforcement is a firewall-layer control, not an application-layer convention (correction B). HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY configure containerd for a clean pull path; they enforce nothing on their own. - src/egress.js — per-environment dedicated iptables chain (ROOTNODE-ENV-<short-id>), built with -A (append, order-preserving) rather than the -I (insert-at-head) pattern an earlier design draft used, which would have installed rules in reverse order and let the default-deny shadow the proxy/DNS accepts. Required infrastructure (egress proxy, DNS) is explicitly permitted first, then RFC1918 ranges are dropped unconditionally, then a final default-deny catches the public internet. One jump rule per environment hooks its subnet into its chain from DOCKER-USER (the chain Docker guarantees it won't silently rewrite). Destroy is deterministic: unhook, flush, delete — no comment-grep matching. The ordering fix is empirically verified, not just reasoned about: the egress proxy's own address is itself an RFC1918 address (it's Platform-side infrastructure), and testing confirms it's reachable while the broader RFC1918 range is still blocked — exactly the scenario the original ordering bug would have broken. - platform/egress-proxy/ — shared Squid instance (one per deployment, not per-student), destination-allowlisted (dstdomain ACL against a plain-text allowlist file), starting set covers docker.io/ghcr.io/gcr.io/quay.io/k8s.io. Proxy performs domain allowlisting; the firewall chain above is what makes it unbypassable, not the other way around. The egress proxy's address is resolved per-student-network (each network's Docker gateway IP, since the proxy runs with host networking and is present on every bridge gateway) rather than a fixed hostname — a static address wouldn't be reachable from more than one isolated student network at a time. Found while testing with two simultaneous environments. Verified: student-to-student isolation (A cannot reach B's internal IP), RFC1918 blocking (A cannot reach a simulated trusted-infra address), and the proxy allowlist itself (CONNECT tunnel to an allowlisted host succeeds, non-allowlisted gets a clean 403 from Squid). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <[email protected]>
18 lines
682 B
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18 lines
682 B
Plaintext
# RootNode Academy egress allowlist — one domain per line, matched with Squid's dstdomain ACL
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# (a leading "." matches the domain and all subdomains). Configuration-driven, operator-edited,
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# never student- or Lab-container-writable (docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md §6).
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#
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# Starting set covers what the existing scenario content actually pulls (nginx, busybox-style
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# images used across scenarios/data/*.json setup_commands) — confirm/expand against real usage
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# before relying on this for a live cohort; this is a first pass, not a final audit.
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.docker.io
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.docker.com
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registry-1.docker.io
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auth.docker.io
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production.cloudflare.docker.com
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.ghcr.io
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.gcr.io
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.k8s.io
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.quay.io
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