// POST /api/auth/instructor/login, POST /api/auth/logout, GET /api/auth/session, // POST /api/auth/change-password — replaces Phase 2B's single shared ADMIN_PASSWORD // (/api/admin/login) with real per-instructor accounts. See // docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md. const { verifyPassword, hashPassword } = require('./auth/password'); const { getInstructorByEmail, publicInstructor } = require('./instructors'); const { recordAudit } = require('./audit'); const { makeCsrfToken, tooManyAttempts, parseCookies, checkCsrf } = require('./security'); const { buildCookie, clearCookie } = require('./cookies'); const INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE = 'rn_instructor'; const CSRF_COOKIE = 'rn_csrf_i'; const LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 8; const LOGIN_WINDOW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // 5 min module.exports = function registerInstructorAuthRoutes(app, { pool, sessions, instructorSession }) { app.post('/api/auth/instructor/login', async (req, res) => { const { email, password } = req.body || {}; const rateKey = `${req.ip}:${String(email || '').toLowerCase()}`; if (await tooManyAttempts(pool, rateKey, LOGIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS, LOGIN_WINDOW_MS)) { return res.status(429).json({ error: 'too_many_attempts', message: 'Too many login attempts. Try again in a few minutes.' }); } if (!email || !password) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'email and password are required' }); const instructor = await getInstructorByEmail(pool, email); // Same generic response whether the email doesn't exist or the password is wrong — no // account enumeration. Only once the password is ALSO correct do we distinguish // "deactivated," which doesn't help an attacker who doesn't already know the password. const passwordOk = instructor && verifyPassword(password, instructor.password_hash); if (!passwordOk) { await recordAudit(pool, { actorType: 'instructor', actorId: instructor?.instructor_id, action: 'login', result: 'failure', sourceIp: req.ip, metadata: { email: String(email).toLowerCase() }, }); return res.status(401).json({ error: 'invalid_credentials', message: 'Invalid email or password.' }); } if (instructor.status !== 'active') { await recordAudit(pool, { actorType: 'instructor', actorId: instructor.instructor_id, action: 'login', result: 'failure', sourceIp: req.ip, metadata: { reason: 'inactive' }, }); return res.status(403).json({ error: 'account_inactive', message: 'This account has been deactivated.' }); } const token = await sessions.createInstructorSession(pool, instructor.instructor_id); const csrf = makeCsrfToken(); await pool.query(`UPDATE instructors SET last_login_at = now() WHERE instructor_id = $1`, [instructor.instructor_id]); await recordAudit(pool, { actorType: 'instructor', actorId: instructor.instructor_id, action: 'login', result: 'success', sourceIp: req.ip }); res.append('Set-Cookie', buildCookie(INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE, token, { maxAgeSec: 12 * 3600 })); res.append('Set-Cookie', buildCookie(CSRF_COOKIE, csrf, { maxAgeSec: 12 * 3600, httpOnly: false })); res.json({ instructor: publicInstructor({ ...instructor, last_login_at: new Date() }) }); }); app.post('/api/auth/logout', async (req, res) => { const token = parseCookies(req)[INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE]; // CSRF is still checked here even though logout is low-severity to forge (the worst case is // an annoying forced sign-out, not data exposure) — consistent enforcement is simpler to // reason about than a documented exception per route. if (!checkCsrf(req, CSRF_COOKIE)) return res.status(403).json({ error: 'csrf' }); // Resolve directly rather than requiring the strict instructorSession middleware — logout // must still succeed (and clear cookies) even against an already-expired/invalid session. const instructorId = await sessions.resolveInstructorSession(pool, token); if (instructorId) { await recordAudit(pool, { actorType: 'instructor', actorId: instructorId, action: 'logout', result: 'success', sourceIp: req.ip }); } await sessions.destroyInstructorSession(pool, token); res.append('Set-Cookie', clearCookie(INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE)); res.append('Set-Cookie', clearCookie(CSRF_COOKIE)); res.json({ ok: true }); }); // GET /api/auth/session — "whoami" for the instructor portal. app.get('/api/auth/session', instructorSession, (req, res) => { res.json({ instructor: publicInstructor(req.instructor) }); }); app.post('/api/auth/change-password', instructorSession, async (req, res) => { // CSRF already checked by instructorSession (server.js) for every non-GET method. const { old_password, new_password } = req.body || {}; if (!old_password || !new_password || new_password.length < 12) { return res.status(400).json({ error: 'new_password must be at least 12 characters' }); } const instructor = req.instructor; // full row (studentSession-style middleware already fetched it) if (!verifyPassword(old_password, instructor.password_hash)) { await recordAudit(pool, { actorType: 'instructor', actorId: instructor.instructor_id, action: 'password_change', result: 'failure', sourceIp: req.ip }); return res.status(401).json({ error: 'invalid_credentials', message: 'Current password is incorrect.' }); } const newHash = hashPassword(new_password); await pool.query(`UPDATE instructors SET password_hash = $1, updated_at = now() WHERE instructor_id = $2`, [newHash, instructor.instructor_id]); // Kill any other lingering sessions for this account — a password change should invalidate // access anywhere else that was logged in, but not the session that just made the change. const currentToken = parseCookies(req)[INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE]; await sessions.revokeAllInstructorSessions(pool, instructor.instructor_id, currentToken); await recordAudit(pool, { actorType: 'instructor', actorId: instructor.instructor_id, action: 'password_change', result: 'success', sourceIp: req.ip }); res.json({ ok: true }); }); }; module.exports.INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE = INSTRUCTOR_COOKIE; module.exports.CSRF_COOKIE = CSRF_COOKIE;