# Phase 10 — Security Audit

Gate 18. A production-oriented review of RootNode Academy's security posture, drawing on every
regression suite rerun this phase (`docs/PHASE10_LAUNCH_READINESS.md`) plus direct code review.
No genuine launch-critical defect was found this phase — the one real defect Phase 10's
predecessor phases exposed (Phase 9.1's webhook-correlation bug) was already fixed and
regression-tested before this phase began.

| Area | Status | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Student authentication | ✅ Verified | `e2e-phase5b.js`/`e2e-phase5c.js` rerun clean this phase — activation, single-use tokens, expiration, password reset with anti-enumeration, session revocation on reset. |
| Instructor authentication | ✅ Verified | Same suites — instructor login, RBAC roles (owner/admin/instructor). |
| Sessions | ✅ Verified | Persistent, server-controlled sessions (Phase 3A); a real Platform API restart preserves sessions/enrollment state (rerun clean this phase). |
| Password reset / activation | ✅ Verified | Single-use, server-side expiration, no plaintext token ever returned by any admin API (`toAdminView` never includes it). |
| RBAC | ✅ Verified | Admin/owner-only routes (guardian detail, payment data) vs. any-instructor routes (offering/location lists) — reconfirmed across Phase 7/8/9 suites this phase. |
| Cohort scoping | ✅ Verified | An instructor sharing a cohort can manage; an unrelated instructor cannot (Phase 5B/7 suites). |
| CSRF | ✅ Present, unchanged | `platform/api/src/security.js` + per-route session/cookie checks (student/instructor auth routes) — not modified this phase, no regression. |
| Rate limiting / lockout | ✅ Present, unchanged | Login-attempt tracking in `security.js` (matches the existing sweeper pattern also used for session expiry). |
| Audit logging | ✅ Verified | Every admin/integration action recorded; audit-hygiene test (no secrets/PII in audit metadata) rerun clean in `e2e-phase9.js`. |
| Server-authoritative pricing | ✅ Verified, real Stripe | Phase 9.1 proved a tampered caller amount is ignored against **Stripe's own recorded object**, not just RootNode's database. |
| Agreement enforcement | ✅ Verified | Checkout blocked (`409`) until acceptance, in both the deterministic suite and real Stripe TEST mode. |
| Capacity enforcement | ✅ Verified | Race-safe seat reservation (`reserved_seats < capacity` in one UPDATE) — last-seat race test rerun clean this phase. |
| No card-data storage | ✅ Verified | `payment_transactions` schema has no card fields; explicit admin-view test asserts none appear; Stripe's hosted Checkout is the only thing that ever sees a real card. |
| Webhook signature verification | ✅ Verified, real Stripe | Invalid/forged signatures rejected (both deterministic and real-Stripe-signed tests); idempotent via a real DB primary key on the provider's event id, reconfirmed with a genuinely re-signed real Stripe event in Phase 9.1. |
| Logging/audit redaction | ✅ Verified | This session's own Stripe secret/webhook-secret values were grepped across every log/scratch file produced — none found; `e2e-phase9.js`'s hygiene test asserts no `sk_`/`whsec_`/card-number pattern in audit metadata or metrics text. |
| Secrets never committed | ✅ Verified | Full-history pickaxe search this phase — clean (`docs/PHASE10_CANONICAL_STATE_AUDIT.md` §1.6). |
| mTLS (Provisioner ↔ Docker, Gateway ↔ Lab Host Router) | ✅ Present, unchanged, not re-verified live | Ansible `docker-tls` role and TLS env vars exist; cannot be exercised against a real mTLS handshake without real hardware (Gate 4/5's hardware blocker). |
| Privileged lab boundary / RFC1918 egress denial | ✅ Present, unchanged | `provisioner/src/egress.js`; this phase reconfirmed the module exists and is wired, did not re-run Phase 1/2's own dedicated isolation drills (out of this phase's changed-code scope — nothing touched networking code). |
| Production cookie settings (`COOKIE_SECURE`) | ✅ Present, verified pattern | `e2e-phase5c.js`'s own test explicitly proves `COOKIE_SECURE=1` production gating via a real container recreate — reconfirmed present, not re-executed as a fresh drill this phase since nothing in that code path changed. |
| HTTPS end-to-end | ⏸ Cannot verify — no production host | `COOKIE_SECURE=1`/`TRUST_PROXY=1` require a real HTTPS-terminating reverse proxy in front of a real Gateway, which doesn't exist yet (Gate 4-6's hardware blocker). The marketing site at `rootnodeacademy.com` IS real HTTPS (Cloudflare) — the Platform API itself has no production endpoint yet. |

## Findings requiring action

**None launch-critical within existing architecture.** Everything marked ⏸ above is blocked on
the same missing production server documented in `docs/PHASE10_PRODUCTION_DEPLOYMENT.md` — not
a code defect, and building around it (e.g. faking an HTTPS check) would violate this phase's
own "do not fake production readiness" instruction.

## Scope discipline

This audit reviewed and reconfirmed existing security properties; it did not expand into new
security tooling, new scanning infrastructure, or unrelated hardening work not already part of
Phase 1-9's architecture, per Phase 10's own "do not expand into unrelated feature work"
instruction.