docs(phase3a): document production identity architecture

New docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md covers the schema, persistent session
design, instructor accounts, the full RBAC matrix, cohort scoping (including the documented
raw-environment-id simplification), student session hardening (explicitly still
classroom/pilot identification, not production auth), CSRF, rate limiting, audit logging,
the API inventory, a security hardening checklist, test results, known limitations, the
future OIDC path, and production HTTPS/cookie expectations — with an explicit BUILT NOW vs.
FUTURE split.

Updates ENGINEERING_SOP.md (new §9/§10, closing a stale '(§9)' forward-reference that dated
back to Phase 2B), LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md status line, README.md, platform/README.md, and
platform/api/README.md (bootstrap-owner usage, new config vars, no more ADMIN_PASSWORD).

README.md

@@ -135,18 +135,19 @@ layers rather than changing the image itself:
 - `platform/provisioner/` — Postgres-backed environment registry, per-student Docker
   networking, firewall-enforced egress, idle reaper (`docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md`).
 - `platform/api/` — lightweight Platform API: students, cohorts, curriculum, progress,
-  scenario attempts, student/admin sessions, instructor/admin control plane. No k3s, no
+  scenario attempts, persistent student/instructor sessions, per-instructor accounts (RBAC:
-  `--privileged` (`docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md`).
+  owner/admin/instructor), audit log, instructor/admin control plane. No k3s, no `--privileged`
+  (`docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md`, `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md`).
 - `platform/gateway/` — the only student-facing path to a Lab: resolves identity from a
-  server-controlled session cookie (not a client-suppliable header/param), proxies
+  server-controlled, persistent session cookie (not a client-suppliable header/param), proxies
   HTTP/WebSocket into that one student's container, never a raw container IP/port
   (`docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md`, session model in
-  `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` §3).
+  `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` §3).
 - The student flow (roster login → curriculum dashboard → Launch Lab → Lab session →
-  Reset/Recreate) lives in `frontend/src/platform/`; the instructor/admin portal
+  Reset/Recreate) lives in `frontend/src/platform/`; the instructor/admin portal (per-instructor
-  (cohorts, students, classroom "Prepare Labs," environment controls) lives in
+  login, cohorts, students, instructor accounts, audit log, classroom "Prepare Labs,"
-  `frontend/src/admin/` at the `/admin` route — both small additions alongside the existing,
+  environment controls) lives in `frontend/src/admin/` at the `/admin` route — both small
-  unmodified Lab UI, not a rewrite of it.
+  additions alongside the existing, unmodified Lab UI, not a rewrite of it.
 
 **Never publish the raw privileged container** — front it with isolation (that's what the
 Gateway is). The one-container `docker run --privileged -p 7554:80 ...` command above stays
@@ -163,16 +164,21 @@ Key properties of the platform (not this image):
   loses their academic record. Verified with a full class-sized (3-student) cohort workflow:
   provision, complete different scenarios, reset one student's Lab, destroy all Labs after
   class — progress survives every step.
-- Instructors manage cohorts, students, curriculum assignment, and classroom Lab prep
+- Instructors sign in with their own account (no shared password) and manage cohorts, students,
-  (provision an entire cohort before class, verify readiness, destroy Labs after) from
+  curriculum assignment, and classroom Lab prep (provision an entire cohort before class, verify
-  `/admin` — no manual database, Docker, or Kubernetes access needed.
+  readiness, destroy Labs after) from `/admin` — no manual database, Docker, or Kubernetes
+  access needed. Owners manage instructor accounts and roles; every instructor/admin action is
+  recorded in an audit log.
+- Sessions (student and instructor) are Postgres-backed and survive a Platform API restart —
+  verified by actually restarting it mid-session and confirming access still works.
 - CPU/memory/PID/storage limits are enforced per container, config-driven.
 - Egress is restricted to an allowlisted proxy at the firewall layer, not left open.
 - Idle/abandoned environments are automatically cleaned up, and a student can launch a fresh
   one and keep going without losing progress.
 
 Production topology and what's built vs. not yet: `docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md`,
-`docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md`, `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md`.
+`docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md`, `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md`,
+`docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md`.
 
 ---
 

docs/ENGINEERING_SOP.md

@@ -139,17 +139,22 @@ Order agreed 2026-08-17/18. Status as of this doc:
    (`⎈ RootNode Academy Lab — node: k8s-lab`). Upstream KubeKosh attribution left untouched in
    footer/README/LICENSE. Broader "make Real Ops first-class" UI work not started.
 2. RootNode curriculum mode — **backend done** (§4), frontend not started.
-3. Student accounts / persistent progress — **backend done** (§5), frontend not started,
+3. Student accounts / persistent progress — **done**, Postgres-authoritative as of Phase 2B
-   no instructor auth yet.
+   (§9), sessions persistent as of Phase 3A (§10). Roster name-picking is still classroom/pilot
-4. Instructor dashboard — not started.
+   identification, not strong student auth — documented, not silently glossed over
-5. Per-student isolation — **Phase 1 (platform foundation) + Phase 2A (Gateway + student flow)
+   (docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md §7).
-   done**, see §8/§9. Ephemeral per-student Lab environments, Gateway-mediated routing, and a
+4. Instructor dashboard — **done** (§9/§10). Full admin portal at `/admin`: dashboard, cohort
-   working entry→dashboard→launch→lab→progress flow are implemented and end-to-end tested on a
+   and student management, classroom Prepare/Destroy Labs, per-instructor accounts with
-   single dev machine, including two simultaneous students with verified cross-student
+   owner/admin/instructor roles, audit log.
-   isolation. **Still not cleared for minors** — pilot-grade identity only (no
+5. Per-student isolation — **Phase 1 + Phase 2A + Phase 2B + Phase 3A done**, see §8/§9/§10.
-   password/SSO), no instructor auth layer, and the production two-VM Proxmox split this
+   Ephemeral per-student Lab environments, Gateway-mediated routing with persistent
-   depends on doesn't exist yet. See `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` for exactly
+   server-controlled sessions, a full instructor/admin control plane with real per-person
-   what's verified vs. not.
+   accounts and RBAC, and a working entry→dashboard→launch→lab→progress flow are implemented
+   and end-to-end tested on a single dev machine, including a 3-student cohort classroom
+   workflow and a real Platform API restart mid-session. **Still not cleared for minors** — the
+   production two-VM Proxmox split this depends on doesn't exist yet, and OIDC/SSO is a
+   documented adapter, not a working integration (docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md
+   §16).
 6. Scenarios → teaching modules (incident context/investigation/prevention) — not started.
 7. Capstone/exam engine — not started (placeholder stage only, see §4).
 8. Progressive hint levels — not started.
@@ -157,9 +162,9 @@ Order agreed 2026-08-17/18. Status as of this doc:
 10. CI scenario testing — not started.
 11. Container/build optimization — explicitly deprioritized by design (platform works, not urgent).
 
-Next slice: Phase 2B — instructor dashboard, production auth/SSO, and the identity/progress
+Next slice: production OIDC/SSO, the production two-VM Proxmox deployment, and teaching-module
-Postgres migration are the biggest remaining items. See
+scenario content are the biggest remaining items. See
-`docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` §9 for the full Phase 2B list.
+`docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` §18 for the full BUILT NOW vs. FUTURE split.
 
 ## 8. Platform Provisioner (Phase 1)
 
@@ -177,7 +182,8 @@ section is just the map.
   auth) or `platform/provisioner/test/run.js` for isolated Provisioner testing.
 - **Where identity lives:** as of Phase 2B, Postgres is authoritative —
   `students`/`cohorts`/`progress`/`scenario_attempts` live in the same `rootnode_platform`
-  database as `environments`, owned by the Platform API's own migrations. See §9.
+  database as `environments`, owned by the Platform API's own migrations. See §9. As of Phase
+  3A, `instructors`/`sessions`/`cohort_instructors`/`audit_events` live there too. See §10.
   `environments.student_id` is still a plain opaque reference, not a real FK — that's a
   deliberate, documented choice (docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md §2), not an oversight.
 - **Local dev:** `platform/provisioner/docker-compose.dev.yml` runs Postgres + the egress
@@ -189,3 +195,41 @@ section is just the map.
   events). Some properties (idle reaper timing, remote TLS lab-host, reconciliation-on-crash,
   real-image k3s behavior) were validated manually during implementation rather than
   automated — see the Phase 1 final report for what and why.
+
+## 9. Platform API (Phase 2B)
+
+Full design: `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md`. Operational reference:
+`platform/api/README.md`.
+
+- **What it is:** `platform/api/` — a lightweight Node/Express service (no k3s, no
+  `--privileged`, no Lab terminal runtime) owning students, cohorts, enrollments, curriculum
+  assignments, progress, scenario attempts, and — as of Phase 3A — instructor accounts,
+  persistent sessions, and the audit log (§10). The sole caller of the Provisioner for both the
+  student launch/reset path and the instructor/admin control plane.
+- **What it is not:** reachable directly by a browser — always through the Gateway
+  (`platform/gateway`), same trust boundary the Provisioner has relative to this service.
+- **Local dev:** part of the same `platform/docker-compose.dev.yml` stack as the Provisioner —
+  no separate compose file.
+- **Test procedure:** `platform/test/e2e-phase2a.js` (student flow) and
+  `platform/test/e2e-phase2b.js` (classroom acceptance workflow) — both need a bootstrapped
+  instructor account as of Phase 3A, see §10.
+
+## 10. Identity and instructor access (Phase 3A)
+
+Full design: `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md`. Operational reference:
+`platform/api/README.md` (bootstrap, config).
+
+- **What it is:** persistent Postgres-backed sessions (student + instructor, survive a Platform
+  API restart), real per-instructor accounts (`owner`/`admin`/`instructor` roles, scrypt
+  password hashing, per-instructor salt), server-enforced RBAC on every `/api/admin/*` route,
+  cohort-scoped access for the plain `instructor` role, CSRF double-submit protection, login
+  rate limiting, and a platform-level `audit_events` log.
+- **What it replaced:** Phase 2B's in-memory session `Map`s (gone on every restart) and the
+  single shared `ADMIN_PASSWORD` env var (no accountability, no roles, no revocation).
+- **Bootstrap:** `node platform/api/bootstrap-owner.js <email> <name> <password>` — the only
+  supported way to create the first instructor account; no manual database editing.
+- **Test procedure:** `platform/test/e2e-phase3a.js` — 21 automated tests covering session
+  persistence (including a real `docker compose restart api`), instructor auth, RBAC, cohort
+  scoping, CSRF, rate limiting, password change, and audit logging.
+- **Known limitations, future OIDC path, production HTTPS expectations:** see
+  `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` §15–17.

docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 # RootNode Academy — Ephemeral Lab Architecture
 
 Status: **Phase 1 (platform foundation) + Phase 2A (Gateway + student flow) + Phase 2B
-(Platform API split, Postgres academic data, server sessions, admin portal) IMPLEMENTED,
+(Platform API split, Postgres academic data, server sessions, admin portal) + Phase 3A
-2026-08-18** — see `docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md`, `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md`,
+(persistent sessions, per-instructor accounts, RBAC, audit log) IMPLEMENTED, 2026-08-18** — see
-and `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` for concrete schema/API/test results, and
+`docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md`, `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md`,
-`platform/README.md` for how to run the stack. This document remains the architecture record
+`docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md`, and `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md`
-for the full ephemeral-lab direction; production OIDC/SSO, per-instructor accounts, and
+for concrete schema/API/test results, and `platform/README.md` for how to run the stack. This
-production Proxmox deployment are still future work (Phase 3+ — see the Phase 2B doc's §13).
+document remains the architecture record for the full ephemeral-lab direction; production
+OIDC/SSO (an adapter interface exists, not a working integration — see the Phase 3A doc §16)
+and production Proxmox deployment are still future work (Phase 3B+ — see the Phase 3A doc §18).
 Supersedes the namespace-isolation
 (`shared_namespace`/`ephemeral_cluster`) approach that was in flight before this redirect — see
 `scenarios/SCHEMA.md`'s `isolation_type` note for the pointer back here.

docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+# Phase 3A — Identity and Instructor Access
+
+Productionizes identity for RootNode Academy: persistent sessions, real per-instructor accounts
+with roles, server-enforced RBAC, CSRF/rate-limiting hardening, and a platform-level audit log.
+Builds on `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` (Platform API split, Postgres migration,
+first-generation session cookies, admin portal) — read that first if you haven't.
+
+## 1. What changed, in one paragraph
+
+Phase 2B's sessions lived in an in-memory `Map` (gone on every restart) and instructor access
+was one shared `ADMIN_PASSWORD` env var (no accountability, no roles, no revocation). Phase 3A
+replaces both: sessions are now rows in Postgres (`sessions` table, survive a restart, are
+individually revocable), and instructors are real accounts (`instructors` table) with a role —
+`owner`, `admin`, or `instructor` — enforced server-side on every `/api/admin/*` route, with a
+plain `instructor` further scoped to the cohorts they're assigned to. Every security-relevant
+action is now recorded in a platform-level audit log (`audit_events`).
+
+## 2. Schema added
+
+```
+instructors         instructor_id, email (unique), display_name, password_hash, role, status,
+                     created_at, updated_at, last_login_at
+auth_identities      auth_identity_id, instructor_id, provider ('local' today), provider_subject,
+                     provider_email, created_at, last_login_at — one 'local' row per instructor;
+                     a future OIDC login adds a second row for the SAME instructor_id, no schema
+                     change needed then.
+sessions             session_id, session_type ('student'|'instructor'), student_id, instructor_id,
+                     token_hash (SHA-256 of the bearer token — the raw token is NEVER stored),
+                     created_at, last_seen_at, expires_at (absolute), idle_expires_at (sliding,
+                     capped at expires_at), revoked_at, metadata
+cohort_instructors   cohort_id, instructor_id, role_in_cohort — scopes the plain 'instructor'
+                     role; owner/admin never consult this table (global visibility by role alone)
+audit_events         audit_event_id, actor_type, actor_id, action, resource_type, resource_id,
+                     result, source_ip, metadata, created_at
+```
+
+All five are new migrations (`platform/api/migrations/007`–`011`), idempotent (the existing
+`schema_migrations` tracking table already guarantees that), and applied automatically on
+Platform API startup — no manual migration step. None of Phase 2B's tables
+(`students`/`cohorts`/`progress`/`scenario_attempts`/etc.) were touched; all Phase 2B data is
+preserved exactly as-is. `sessions.instructor_id` and `cohort_instructors.instructor_id` are
+real foreign keys to `instructors` (both tables live in the same Platform API-owned migration
+set) — unlike `environments.student_id` in the Provisioner's schema, there's no
+cross-service-database reason to keep this one an opaque reference.
+
+## 3. Persistent session design
+
+Browser holds one opaque, CSPRNG bearer token (32 random bytes, base64url) per session, in an
+`HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` cookie (`Secure` too, once `COOKIE_SECURE=1`). The server stores only
+`SHA-256(token)` — a Postgres dump or backup can't be replayed as a working session, same
+principle as password hashing.
+
+Two independent lifecycles (`sessions.session_type`), separate cookie names
+(`rn_session`/`rn_instructor`), separate token namespaces — a bug can't confuse a student
+session for an instructor one. Each session has:
+
+- **Absolute expiry** (`expires_at`, fixed at creation) — 8h student / 12h instructor by default,
+  configurable via `STUDENT_SESSION_TTL_HOURS` / `INSTRUCTOR_SESSION_TTL_HOURS`.
+- **Idle expiry** (`idle_expires_at`, slides forward on every authenticated request, never past
+  `expires_at`) — 2h default for both, configurable via `*_SESSION_IDLE_HOURS`.
+
+Resolving a session (`sessions.js` `resolveSession`) is one atomic `UPDATE ... RETURNING` that
+checks `revoked_at IS NULL AND expires_at > now() AND idle_expires_at > now()` and slides the
+idle window forward in the same round trip — no separate read-then-write race.
+
+**Restart behavior:** a Platform API restart no longer logs anyone out — verified in
+`platform/test/e2e-phase3a.js` by actually running `docker compose restart api` mid-test and
+confirming both an instructor session and a student session still resolve afterward.
+
+**Role/status changes take effect immediately, no revocation needed:** the instructor session
+middleware re-fetches the instructor row from Postgres on *every* request rather than trusting
+anything cached in the session token — so demoting a role or deactivating an account is live on
+the very next request that account makes, with no separate "walk every session and revoke"
+step required. Explicit revocation (owner-triggered "revoke all sessions," and automatic on
+password change) exists too, for the case where you want to kill an active session immediately
+rather than wait for its next request.
+
+## 4. Instructor accounts
+
+`instructors.password_hash` is `scrypt` with a **per-instructor random salt** (Phase 2B's
+`admin-auth.js` used one fixed salt because there was exactly one shared password — that's gone,
+this is real per-row salting now), stored as `"<salt-hex>:<hash-hex>"`, verified with
+`crypto.timingSafeEqual`. No plaintext password ever touches a log line, a database column, or
+an API response body (`publicInstructor()` strips `password_hash` before any JSON response).
+
+Bootstrap: `node platform/api/bootstrap-owner.js <email> <name> [password]` — the only supported
+way to create the first account, so a fresh deployment never requires editing Postgres by hand.
+Refuses to run if an active owner already exists unless the target email is an existing
+instructor (the intended zero-owners recovery path).
+
+## 5. Role model (RBAC matrix)
+
+| Action | owner | admin | instructor |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| Manage instructor accounts (create/edit/deactivate/reset password/revoke sessions) | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
+| View audit log | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
+| Create/edit cohorts, create/edit students, assign curriculum | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
+| Assign an instructor to a cohort | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |
+| View dashboard, cohort list, cohort/student detail, progress | ✅ (global) | ✅ (global) | ✅ (**assigned cohorts only**) |
+| Prepare Labs / Destroy Cohort Labs, provision a student's Lab | ✅ (any cohort) | ✅ (any cohort) | ✅ (**assigned cohorts only**) |
+| Reset/destroy/view-events by raw environment id | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ — see §6 |
+
+Enforced by `src/rbac.js`, applied per-route in `src/admin-routes.js` — never in the frontend
+alone (`frontend/src/admin/*.jsx` hides controls a role can't use, but that's UX; every route
+re-checks server-side regardless of what the browser sends or hides). A denied request gets a
+flat `403 {"error":"forbidden"}` — no distinction in the response between "wrong role" and
+"right role, wrong cohort," and no distinction between "resource doesn't exist" and "you can't
+see it," so a 403 never confirms anything about what exists to someone probing.
+
+An unauthenticated request gets `401`, not `403` — the two are kept distinct throughout.
+
+## 6. Cohort-scoped instructor access
+
+`cohort_instructors` maps `instructor_id → cohort_id` (assigned by an owner/admin, never
+self-service). A plain `instructor` role's requests to cohort- or student-keyed routes go
+through `requireCohortAccess`/`requireStudentCohortAccess`, which check this table;
+owner/admin bypass it entirely (global visibility by role alone).
+
+**Deliberate simplification:** the raw `/api/admin/environments/:id/{reset,DELETE,events}`
+routes (operate directly on a Provisioner environment id, no cohort context in the URL) stay
+owner/admin-only rather than resolving cohort scope from a bare environment id — that resolution
+would need an extra Provisioner round trip on every single call. A plain instructor still has
+full Lab control, just via the cohort/student-scoped routes (`/cohorts/:id/prepare-labs`,
+`/students/:id/environment/provision`, etc.), which already carry the scope check. Upgrade path
+if this ever needs to change: add a `student_id`/`cohort_id` lookup to the Provisioner's
+`GET /environments/:id` response and extend `requireCohortAccess` to resolve through it.
+
+## 7. Student session hardening
+
+The pick-your-name roster flow is unchanged UX — **this is classroom/pilot identification, not
+production authentication.** There is still no password or possession factor at the identity
+step; anyone who knows a display name (or can see the roster dropdown) can "become" that
+student. What Phase 3A hardens is everything *after* that pick:
+
+- The resulting session is server-controlled and now **persistent** (survives a Platform API
+  restart — verified, see §3).
+- A student cannot switch identity by editing client state — there's nothing client-side to
+  edit; the cookie is `HttpOnly` and opaque.
+- Logout revokes the session server-side (`sessions.destroyStudentSession`), not just a
+  client-side cookie clear.
+- Every Gateway-proxied Lab request (HTTP and WebSocket) re-verifies ownership against the
+  session on every request, not just the initial navigation — unchanged from Phase 2B, still
+  true here.
+- A student session can never call `/api/admin/*` — those routes require an `rn_instructor`
+  session in a completely separate cookie/token namespace.
+- CSRF (see §8) now also protects student mutating routes (`/api/environment/launch`, `/reset`,
+  `/api/progress/record`, `/api/logout`) the same way it protects instructor ones.
+
+**Future upgrade path that doesn't require touching the session system:** one-time student
+enrollment codes, parent-issued codes, or institutional SSO would all still terminate in the
+exact same `sessions` table and `rn_session` cookie — only the *identity verification step*
+before `createStudentSession()` is called would change. This is why the session store was worth
+building as a shared, session-type-agnostic module rather than something bespoke to the current
+roster-picker.
+
+## 8. CSRF protection
+
+Double-submit cookie pattern, on top of (not instead of) `SameSite=Lax`. On login, a
+**non-HttpOnly** cookie is set — `rn_csrf_s` (student) / `rn_csrf_i` (instructor) — deliberately
+readable by the frontend's own JS via `document.cookie`. Every state-changing request
+(`POST`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) must echo that value back as an `X-CSRF-Token` header; the server
+checks the header matches the cookie it's holding for that same request. A cross-origin
+attacker's page can trigger a cookie-carrying request but can't read the cookie's value (browser
+same-origin policy) or attach a matching custom header without CORS, which isn't granted to
+other origins — so it can never produce a request where the two match.
+
+`GET`/`HEAD`/`OPTIONS` are exempt (nothing to protect). Applied uniformly, including to
+`/api/logout` and `/api/auth/logout` — a forged logout is low-severity, but consistent
+enforcement was simpler to reason about than a per-route exception.
+
+**One real bug found while testing this:** the Gateway's own progress-relay call
+(`platform/gateway/src/server.js` `relayScenarioOutcome`, triggered when a student solves a
+scenario inside their Lab) is a server-to-server call to `POST /api/progress/record`, not a
+browser one — but it's relaying the browser's own session, so it needs to forward the CSRF
+token too. The first fix attempt forwarded only the `X-CSRF-Token` header and still 403'd,
+because the double-submit check needs BOTH the cookie *and* a matching header on the request
+Platform API actually receives — the fix forwards both.
+
+## 9. Login rate limiting
+
+In-memory sliding window (`src/security.js`), keyed by `ip:email`, max 8 attempts per 5 minutes,
+`429` past that. No new dependency — small enough to hand-roll. **Known limitation:** in-memory
+means it resets on a Platform API restart and doesn't share state across multiple instances; a
+Postgres- or Redis-backed limiter would be the upgrade if this ever needs to survive a restart
+or scale beyond one process. Not needed at pilot scale.
+
+## 10. Audit log
+
+`audit_events`, distinct from the Provisioner's `environment_events` (Lab-lifecycle-only).
+Records: instructor login success/failure, logout, password change, instructor
+created/updated/deactivated, role changes, session revocation, cohort create/update, roster
+changes, curriculum assignment, Prepare Labs, Lab reset/destroy, and every `403` authorization
+denial (recorded centrally by the RBAC middleware itself, not sprinkled per-route). Never
+records plaintext passwords, raw session tokens, Provisioner secrets, or raw routing tokens —
+verified by an explicit test assertion (`e2e-phase3a.js` "audit log" case scans recorded
+metadata for anything password-shaped). Viewable at `/admin` → Audit (owner/admin only), latest
+200 events, no pagination UI yet — pilot-scale, not a SIEM.
+
+## 11. API inventory (new/changed)
+
+```
+POST /api/auth/instructor/login       email+password login, rate-limited, no enumeration
+POST /api/auth/logout                 revokes the current instructor session
+GET  /api/auth/session                current instructor identity (role, etc.)
+POST /api/auth/change-password        requires current password; revokes other sessions
+
+POST /api/login                       UNCHANGED route, now backed by persistent sessions
+POST /api/logout                      UNCHANGED route, now CSRF-checked + persistent revoke
+GET  /api/session/whoami              UNCHANGED — Gateway's ownership-check dependency
+
+GET    /api/admin/instructors             owner only
+POST   /api/admin/instructors             owner only
+GET    /api/admin/instructors/:id         owner only — includes session list
+PATCH  /api/admin/instructors/:id         owner only — role/status/name; blocks removing the last active owner
+POST   /api/admin/instructors/:id/revoke-sessions   owner only
+POST   /api/admin/instructors/:id/reset-password    owner only — also revokes that instructor's sessions
+GET    /api/admin/audit-events            admin/owner
+POST   /api/admin/cohorts/:id/instructors owner/admin — assigns an instructor to a cohort
+```
+
+Every pre-existing `/api/admin/*` route from Phase 2B still exists at the same path — behavior
+unchanged for owner/admin, newly scoped for the `instructor` role (see §5/§6). `/api/admin/login`,
+`/api/admin/logout`, `/api/admin/whoami` (the old shared-password routes) are gone — replaced by
+the `/api/auth/instructor/*` routes above.
+
+## 12. Frontend/admin changes
+
+- `AdminPortal.jsx` — email+password login form (was a bare password field); nav now
+  conditionally shows Instructors (owner) and Audit (owner/admin) tabs; adds an Account tab.
+- `InstructorsView.jsx` (new) — create/list/edit instructors, role/status controls, session list
+  + revoke-all, password reset.
+- `AuditView.jsx` (new) — read-only audit event table.
+- `AccountView.jsx` (new) — change-password form for the signed-in instructor.
+- `CohortsView.jsx` — create-cohort form and curriculum-assignment button hidden for the
+  `instructor` role (server already enforces this; this just avoids showing controls that would
+  403).
+- `frontend/src/admin/api.js` / `frontend/src/platform/api.js` — both now read the relevant
+  `rn_csrf_*` cookie and attach `X-CSRF-Token` on every mutating call.
+
+## 13. Security hardening review (what was checked)
+
+- **Cookie settings** — `HttpOnly` on session cookies, `SameSite=Lax`, `Secure` gated behind
+  `COOKIE_SECURE=1` (off by default for local HTTP dev).
+- **CSRF** — §8.
+- **Login brute force** — §9.
+- **Session fixation** — every login issues a brand-new session row (never reuses/upgrades an
+  existing token), so there's nothing to "fix" a pre-auth session into.
+- **Password handling** — §4.
+- **Account enumeration** — identical response for unknown-email and wrong-password (tested).
+- **Authorization bypass** — every `/api/admin/*` route re-checks server-side (§5); tested with
+  both role-based and cohort-scoped negative cases.
+- **Inactive accounts** — rejected at the session-middleware level on every request, not just at
+  login (a deactivation takes effect immediately, §3).
+- **Revoked sessions** — `resolveSession`'s `WHERE revoked_at IS NULL` makes a revoked session
+  fail identically to an expired one.
+- **Role downgrade/upgrade session invalidation** — handled by the live re-fetch design (§3),
+  not a separate revoke pass.
+- **WebSocket authentication** — unchanged from Phase 2A/2B: the Gateway's WS upgrade handler
+  re-verifies ownership via the same session-resolution path as HTTP.
+- **Gateway ownership checks** — unchanged mechanism, tightened cache TTL (5000ms → 2000ms) so a
+  revoked session stops working at the Gateway within a tighter, tested bound.
+- **`trust proxy`** — off by default, opt-in via `TRUST_PROXY=1`, so `req.ip` (used for audit
+  `source_ip` and rate-limit keys) isn't trivially spoofable via `X-Forwarded-For` unless a real
+  trusted proxy is actually in front.
+
+## 14. Test results
+
+- `platform/provisioner/test/run.js` (Phase 1, isolated stack) — **not re-run this phase**: zero
+  source changes to `platform/provisioner/` (confirmed via `git diff`), and its own dev compose
+  stack collides on port 5433 with the shared `platform/docker-compose.dev.yml` stack used for
+  everything else in this phase. Provisioner was still exercised heavily and indirectly through
+  every e2e suite below (provision/reset/destroy, concurrent Prepare Labs, cohort-scoped
+  operations) — all passing.
+- `platform/test/e2e-phase2a.js` — **10/10 passed** (student flow, now under persistent sessions).
+- `platform/test/e2e-phase2b.js` — **12/12 passed** (classroom workflow, now under real
+  instructor accounts instead of a shared password).
+- `platform/test/e2e-phase3a.js` — **21/21 passed**: no-enumeration, CSRF positive+negative,
+  rate limiting, role creation, RBAC denial (instructor→owner-only, instructor→admin-only,
+  admin→owner-only), cohort scoping (visibility + access), last-owner protection, live
+  role/status re-evaluation, password change + old-password rejection + other-session
+  revocation, audit log content (including the no-secrets assertion), student session RBAC,
+  student logout revocation, and session persistence across a real `docker compose restart api`.
+- Real Lab image — rebuilt clean; standalone `--privileged` single-container mode boots and
+  serves with zero Platform API/Postgres/Provisioner dependency (verified live).
+- Frontend production build — clean, no errors.
+- Scenario content / Real Ops bundle / Lab `Dockerfile`/`backend/`/`scripts/` — `git diff`
+  against the Phase 2B milestone SHA is empty for all of them: untouched.
+
+## 15. Known limitations
+
+- **Login rate limiting is in-memory, single-process** (§9) — resets on restart, doesn't share
+  state across multiple Platform API instances. Fine at pilot scale.
+- **Gateway session cache is a 2-second window** — a revoked/expired session can still work at
+  the Gateway for up to ~2s after revocation (tightened from 5s in Phase 2B). Platform API
+  itself always reflects revocation immediately; this bound is specific to the Gateway's
+  whoami-result cache, which exists purely to avoid a Platform API round trip on every single
+  proxied Lab byte.
+- **No distributed session revocation push** — revoking a session updates Postgres immediately;
+  anything holding a *cached* copy of "this session is valid" (only the Gateway does this, and
+  only for 2s) catches up on its next cache miss, not instantly.
+- **Audit log has no pagination UI** — latest 200 events only. Add pagination if usage ever
+  exceeds that being useful.
+- **Roster name-picking is still not strong student identity** (§7) — explicitly documented,
+  not silently glossed over.
+- **`cohort_instructors` role_in_cohort field exists but isn't consulted for finer-grained
+  permissions yet** — currently any assignment grants the full `instructor` role's cohort-scoped
+  actions; a co-teacher vs. lead-teacher distinction within a cohort would consume this field but
+  isn't built.
+- **Exam mode's live bookkeeping is still Lab-local** — unchanged from Phase 2B, still a real gap
+  for anyone relying on cross-restart exam state.
+
+## 16. Future OIDC path
+
+`auth_identities` (§2) already supports it structurally: a Google/OIDC login would create a
+second `auth_identities` row (`provider='google'`, `provider_subject=<their sub>`) pointing at
+an existing `instructor_id`, or create a new `instructors` row + `auth_identities` row for a
+first-time SSO login. The missing piece is the actual OIDC client flow (discovery, token
+exchange, JWT verification) — deliberately **not built this phase**, per the explicit scope
+instruction to stop at a documented adapter interface rather than pull in an OIDC client
+library and expand scope. `instructors.password_hash` staying nullable (already the case) is
+what allows an SSO-only account to exist with no local password at all, whenever that flow is
+built.
+
+## 17. Production HTTPS / cookie expectations
+
+Local dev and the current single-VM pilot deployment run over plain HTTP — `COOKIE_SECURE` is
+unset (cookies lack `Secure`) and `TRUST_PROXY` is unset by default. Before any real-HTTPS
+production deployment: set `COOKIE_SECURE=1` (cookies become HTTPS-only) and, if fronted by a
+reverse proxy/load balancer, set `TRUST_PROXY=1` so `req.ip` reflects the real client IP instead
+of the proxy's.
+
+## 18. BUILT NOW vs. FUTURE
+
+**Built now:** persistent Postgres-backed sessions (student + instructor), per-instructor
+accounts with scrypt password hashing, three-role RBAC enforced server-side, cohort-scoped
+instructor access, CSRF double-submit protection, login rate limiting, platform audit log,
+owner-safety invariant (never zero active owners), password change with other-session
+revocation, `auth_identities` table ready for future OIDC mapping.
+
+**Future (not built):** real OIDC/SSO client flow, multi-instance-safe rate limiting, audit log
+pagination/export, cohort_instructors role-in-cohort permission granularity, distributed
+(non-Gateway-cache) session revocation push, one-time student enrollment codes /
+parent-issued codes, everything already on the Phase 2B "DO NOT BUILD YET" list (capstone
+engine, billing, production Proxmox deployment, etc.) — unchanged, still not in scope.

platform/README.md

@@ -7,13 +7,15 @@ Start here, then go to the component you need:
   `docs/LAB_ARCHITECTURE.md`, `docs/PHASE1_PLATFORM_FOUNDATION.md`. Operational reference:
   `provisioner/README.md`.
 - `api/` — the lightweight Platform API: students, cohorts, enrollments, curriculum, progress,
-  scenario attempts, student/admin sessions, and the instructor/admin control plane. No k3s, no
+  scenario attempts, per-instructor accounts, persistent student/instructor sessions, RBAC,
-  `--privileged` — this replaced Phase 2A's "identity" instance, which was a full Lab image
+  audit logging, and the instructor/admin control plane. No k3s, no `--privileged` — this
-  booting an unused k3s cluster just to serve these APIs. Design:
+  replaced Phase 2A's "identity" instance, which was a full Lab image booting an unused k3s
-  `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md`. Operational reference: `api/README.md`.
+  cluster just to serve these APIs. Design: `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` (split +
+  Postgres migration), `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` (sessions, accounts,
+  RBAC, audit). Operational reference: `api/README.md`.
 - `gateway/` — the only student-facing path to a Lab (HTTP + WebSocket proxy, environment-aware
   routing derived from a server-controlled session — not a client-suppliable header/param).
-  Design: `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` (routing), `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` §3 (session ownership).
+  Design: `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` (routing), `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` (persistent sessions, CSRF).
 - `egress-proxy/` — shared allowlisting proxy every Lab's outbound traffic passes through.
 - `docker-compose.dev.yml` — the full stack (Postgres, egress proxy, Provisioner, Platform API,
   Gateway) on one machine. This is the Phase 1/2A/2B **local dev exception** — production is
@@ -24,14 +26,20 @@ Start here, then go to the component you need:
 ```bash
 cd platform
 echo "PROVISIONER_SHARED_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env
-echo "ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 12)" >> .env
 docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml build
 docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
+
+# First run only — create the owner account (no ADMIN_PASSWORD anymore, see
+# docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md):
+cd api
+PLATFORM_DB_URL=postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/rootnode_platform \
+  node bootstrap-owner.js [email protected] "Your Name" "a-real-password-12-chars-plus"
 ```
 
 No k3s boot to wait for at this layer anymore (Platform API starts instantly) — the whole
 platform is reachable at `http://localhost:4200` (the Gateway) right away: students at `/`,
-instructors at `/admin`.
+instructors at `/admin` (sign in with the owner account you just bootstrapped, then create
+further instructor accounts from the Instructors tab).
 
 ## Tests
 
@@ -42,16 +50,20 @@ instructors at `/admin`.
 - `test/e2e-phase2b.js` — the classroom acceptance workflow: instructor creates a cohort, adds
   students, assigns curriculum, Prepare Labs (concurrent), students complete different
   scenarios, instructor resets one, instructor destroys all cohort Labs after class — progress
-  survives every step. Needs `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set (see `platform/.env`).
+  survives every step.
+- `test/e2e-phase3a.js` — persistent sessions (including a real Platform API restart), instructor
+  auth (no enumeration, rate limiting), RBAC across owner/admin/instructor, cohort-scoped
+  instructor access, CSRF enforcement, password change, and audit logging.
 
-Both e2e suites are slow (real k3s boots) and need the full stack up. Neither substitutes for
+All three e2e suites need `OWNER_EMAIL` / `OWNER_PASSWORD` set to a real bootstrapped instructor
-the manual real-Lab-image checks (node-pty, terminal WebSocket, `kubectl`, scenario validation)
+account (see "Running the full stack locally" above) — the old `ADMIN_PASSWORD` mechanism is
-in `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` §8 — those need a browser-equivalent client and
+gone. They're slow (real k3s boots) and need the full stack up. None of them substitute for the
+manual real-Lab-image checks (node-pty, terminal WebSocket, `kubectl`, scenario validation) in
+`docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` §8 — those need a browser-equivalent client and
 aren't automated here.
 
 ## Known limitations
 
 See `provisioner/README.md` (Phase 1), `docs/PHASE2A_GATEWAY_AND_STUDENT_FLOW.md` §9 (Phase
-2A), and `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` §13 (Phase 2B) for the full, honest lists —
+2A), and `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` (Phase 3A, supersedes Phase 2B's
-including in-memory sessions, the single shared admin credential, and exam mode's live
+identity limitations) for the full, honest lists.
-bookkeeping staying Lab-local.

platform/api/README.md

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
-# RootNode Academy — Platform API (Phase 2B)
+# RootNode Academy — Platform API (Phase 3A)
 
 Lightweight service: no k3s, no `--privileged`, no Lab terminal runtime. See
-`docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` for the design; this is the operational reference.
+`docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` for the original split/migration design and
+`docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` for persistent sessions, per-instructor
+accounts, RBAC, and audit logging — this file is the operational reference.
 
 ## Configuration reference
 
@@ -10,25 +12,46 @@ Lightweight service: no k3s, no `--privileged`, no Lab terminal runtime. See
 | `PLATFORM_DB_URL` | no (defaults to local dev Postgres) | Postgres connection string |
 | `PROVISIONER_URL` | no | Provisioner base URL |
 | `PROVISIONER_SHARED_SECRET` | **yes** | Internal Provisioner auth — process refuses to start without it |
-| `ADMIN_PASSWORD` | **yes** | Instructor login credential — process refuses to start without it. Verified via scrypt+timing-safe compare, never stored or logged in plaintext |
 | `PLATFORM_API_PORT` | no | Listen port, default 4300 |
 | `FRONTEND_DIST_DIR` | no | Where the built frontend lives — set by the Dockerfile, override for local non-Docker dev |
 | `SCENARIOS_DIR` / `BUNDLES_DIR` / `CURRICULUM_PATH_FILE` | no | Override the default `scenarios/` locations, mainly for local dev outside Docker |
+| `STUDENT_SESSION_TTL_HOURS` / `STUDENT_SESSION_IDLE_HOURS` | no | Default 8h / 2h |
+| `INSTRUCTOR_SESSION_TTL_HOURS` / `INSTRUCTOR_SESSION_IDLE_HOURS` | no | Default 12h / 2h |
+| `COOKIE_SECURE` | no | Set to `1` once served over real HTTPS — adds `Secure` to every session/CSRF cookie |
+| `TRUST_PROXY` | no | Set to `1` once fronted by a trusted reverse proxy — honors `X-Forwarded-For` for `req.ip` (audit `source_ip`, login rate limiting) |
+
+There is no `ADMIN_PASSWORD` anymore — instructor accounts live in Postgres (`instructors`
+table), created via `bootstrap-owner.js` for the first one and the admin portal after that.
 
 ## Local dev
 
 ```bash
 cd platform
 echo "PROVISIONER_SHARED_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32)" > .env
-echo "ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 12)" >> .env
 docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml build
 docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml up -d
+
+cd api
+PLATFORM_DB_URL=postgres://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/rootnode_platform \
+  node bootstrap-owner.js [email protected] "Your Name" "a-real-password-12-chars-plus"
 ```
 
 Everything is reachable through the Gateway at `http://localhost:4200` — students at `/`,
-instructors at `/admin`. Platform API itself isn't meant to be hit directly by a browser (same
+instructors at `/admin` (sign in with the bootstrapped owner). Platform API itself isn't meant
-boundary as the Provisioner relative to Platform API), though nothing stops you from curling
+to be hit directly by a browser (same boundary as the Provisioner relative to Platform API),
-it directly at `:4300` for local debugging.
+though nothing stops you from curling it directly at `:4300` for local debugging.
+
+## Owner bootstrap
+
+```bash
+node bootstrap-owner.js <email> <display_name> [password]
+```
+
+Prefer `BOOTSTRAP_OWNER_PASSWORD` over the positional argument outside a throwaway local test —
+CLI args can leak into shell history and `ps`. Refuses to run if an active owner already exists
+unless the target email belongs to an existing instructor (the intended recovery path if a
+platform is ever locked out with zero owners: point this at a known instructor account to
+promote them).
 
 ## SQLite migration
 
@@ -42,17 +65,20 @@ docker run --rm -v <identity-data-volume>:/data \
 
 Always backs up the SQLite file first, is safe to re-run, and writes a JSON report — see
 `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` §2/§3 for the full guarantees and rollback
-procedure.
+procedure. This step is about academic data (students/cohorts/progress) — it has nothing to do
+with instructor accounts, which are Phase 3A-native and start empty until you bootstrap one.
 
 ## Tests
 
-`platform/test/e2e-phase2a.js` (student-flow regression, cookie-based) and
+`platform/test/e2e-phase2a.js` (student-flow regression), `platform/test/e2e-phase2b.js` (the
-`platform/test/e2e-phase2b.js` (the classroom acceptance workflow: cohort → students →
+classroom acceptance workflow), and `platform/test/e2e-phase3a.js` (persistent sessions
-curriculum → Prepare Labs → complete scenarios → reset → destroy-labs → progress survives).
+including a real restart, instructor auth, RBAC, cohort scoping, CSRF, audit log). All three
-Both need the full stack up and `ADMIN_PASSWORD` set — see `platform/README.md`.
+need the full stack up and `OWNER_EMAIL` / `OWNER_PASSWORD` set to a bootstrapped account — see
+`platform/README.md`.
 
 ## Known limitations
 
-See `docs/PHASE2B_ADMIN_AND_PLATFORM_DATA.md` §13 — in-memory sessions (a restart logs
+See `docs/PHASE3A_IDENTITY_AND_INSTRUCTOR_ACCESS.md` "Known limitations" — sessions are
-everyone out), exam mode's live bookkeeping stays Lab-local, single shared admin credential
+Postgres-backed (survive a restart) but there's no distributed revocation channel to the
-rather than per-instructor accounts.
+Gateway's short-lived whoami cache, exam mode's live bookkeeping stays Lab-local, and OIDC/SSO
+is a documented adapter interface, not a working integration yet.